z/OS BMC CONTROL-M for ACF2 STIG Version Comparison
z/OS BMC CONTROL-M for ACF2 Security Technical Implementation Guide
There are 5 differences between versions v6 r8 (Oct. 26, 2018) (the "left" version) and v6 r10 (Nov. 23, 2022) (the "right" version).
Check ZCTMA000 was changed between these two versions. Green, underlined text was added, red, struck-out text was removed.
BMC CONTROL-M installation data sets will be properly protected.
Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection: - Collection: - SENSITVE.RPT(CTMRPT) Automated SENSITVE.RPT(CTMRPT) Automated Analysis Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection: - PDI(ZCTM0000) Verify Collection: - PDI(ZCTM0000) Verify that the accesses to the BMC CONTROL-M installation data sets are properly restricted. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding. ___ The finding. ___ The ACF2 data set access authorizations restrict READ access to auditors, automated operations, BMC users, operations, production control and scheduling personnel (domain level and decentralized), and BMC STCs and/or batch users. ___ The users. ___ The ACF2 data set access authorizations restrict WRITE and/or greater access to systems programming personnel. ___ The personnel. ___ The ACF2 data set access authorizations specify that all (i.e., failures and successes) WRITE and/or greater access are logged.
BMC CONTROL-M installation data sets have the ability to use privileged functions and/or have access to sensitive data. Failure to properly restrict access to these data sets could result in violating the integrity of the base product which could result in compromising the operating system or sensitive data.
The IAO ISSO will ensure that WRITE and/or greater access to BMC CONTROL-M installation data sets are limited to System systems Programmers programmers only, and all WRITE and/or greater access is logged. READ access can be given to auditors, automated operations, BMC users, operations, production control and scheduling personnel (domain level and decentralized), and BMC STCs and/or batch users. All failures and successful WRITE and/or greater accesses are logged. The installing Systems systems Programmer programmer will identify and document the product data sets and categorize them according to who will have update and alter access and if required that all update and allocate access is logged. He The installing systems programmer will identify if any additional groups have update and/or alter access for specific data sets, and once documented he will work with the IAO ISSO to ensure see that they are properly restricted to the ACP (Access Control Program) active on the system. (Note: The data sets and/or data set prefixes identified below are examples of a possible installation. The actual data sets and/or prefixes are determined when the product is actually installed on a system through the product’s product's installation guide and can be site specific.) Data sets to be protected will be: SYS2.IOA.*.CTMI. The following commands are provided as a sample for implementing data set controls: $KEY(SYS2) IOA.-.CTMI.- UID(<syspaudt>) R(A) W(L) A(L) E(A) IOA.-.CTMI.- UID(<audtaudt>) R(A) E(A) IOA.-.CTMI.- UID(<autoaudt>) R(A) E(A) IOA.-.CTMI.- UID(<bmcuser>) R(A) E(A) IOA.-.CTMI.- UID(<dpcsaudt>) R(A) E(A) IOA.-.CTMI.- UID(<operaudt>) R(A) E(A) IOA.-.CTMI.- UID(<pcspaudt>) R(A) E(A) IOA.-.CTMI.- UID(CONTROLM) R(A) E(A)